The East Central Illinois Criminal Law & DUI Weblog

Case Name:  People v. Riffice (.pdf)

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District

Date Decision Filed: 7/8/09

In this case, the defendant, on September 30, 2008,  filed a petition to rescind her statutory summary suspension.  The trial court held a hearing on the petition on October 30, 2008.  Depending on whether the filing date is counted, the hearing date was on either the 30th or 31st day after the defendant filed her rescission petition.  By statute, a rescission hearing must be held “[w]ithin 30 days after receipt of the written request [. . .].”  The appellate court relied on an earlier appellate-court decision (Second District) and ruled that the time period’s first day (the day of filing) does not count; the calculation of the 30-day period begins with the day following the filing date.  Accordingly, the trial court conducted a timely hearing in this case since the date of filing did not count towards the 30-day limit.  The trial court held the hearing on the 30th day.

Jeremy Richey

Case Name: People v. Johnson (.pdf)

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District

Date Decision Filed: 6/25/09

In this case, the defendant’s car collided with another car at an intersection.  As a result of the collision, one of the defendant’s passengers died and another received serious injuries.   When tested, the defendant had a BAC of .099.  He also had cannabinoid metabolites in his blood.

The statute applicable to the defendant’s case elevates a DUI to Aggravated DUI if death or great bodily harm occurs due to a vehicle crash and the DUI was a proximate cause of the death or great bodily harm.  A proximate cause is enough; there is no requirement that the DUI be the exclusive and immediate proximate cause.

Prior to the crash, the defendant had been racing with another vehicle.  Immediately before the crash, he went through a yellow light.  The defendant saw the vehicle that he hit, but he thought that the vehicle would stop.  One passenger in the defendant’s car “believed [the] defendant should have slowed down and stopped.”  The driver of the other car testified that he (the other driver) had a green light.  Despite this testimony, the light may have actually been red.

The defendant challenged the existence of proximate cause and the Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s challenge:

Considering [the] defendant’s impairment, along with his erratic driving in speeding down [the road], a reasonable person could foresee injury as a likely result of his conduct.  . . .  Evidence that [the other driver] may have run a red light does not negate [the] defendant’s actions as being a proximate cause of the victims’ injuries.  While [the] defendant’s actions were not the sole and immediate proximate cause of the victims’ injuries in this case, the evidence sufficiently established his actions were a proximate cause and satisfied the elements for a conviction of aggravated DUI.

Jeremy Richey

Case Name: People v. Love (.pdf)

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District

Date Decision Filed: 6/3/09

In this DUI case, a police officer gave the defendant, on her citation, a first court date that was more than 60 days after the defendant’s arrest.  Illinois Supreme Court Rule 504 provides that, in traffic cases, “an accused’s first appearance in court shall not be less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date of the arrest, whenever practicable.”  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss her case since her first court appearance was more than 60 days after the date of her arrest.  The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed her case.  The state’s attorney’s office decided to re-file the case despite the earlier dismissal by the trial court.  The trial court again dismissed the case.  The State appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial court.  It decided, based on existing authority, that the State was permitted to re-file the case.

Jeremy Richey

UPDATE: A modified special concurrence was filed in this case on 7/7/09.  It is available here (.pdf).

Case Name: People v. Van Bellehem (.pdf)

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District

Date Decision Filed: 5/7/09

Before a police officer gives a DUI suspect a breath test at the police station,  he must watch the suspect for twenty minutes to make sure that the suspect does not place something in his or her mouth, vomit, belch, etc.  This twenty minutes is known as an observation or deprivation period.  In Van Bellehem, the defendant testified that she had gum in her mouth during the observation period.  There wasn’t any evidence to corroborate this claim and the trial court did not believe the defendant.  Despite this, the trial court decided that the breath-test evidence was inadmissible since the police officer neither “asked the defendant if she had anything in her mouth” nor “asked her to open her mouth so that he could look inside.”

The appellate court reversed the trial court, because, according to the appellate court,  neither the applicable Illinois regulations nor public policy demand that the police question a DUI suspect in any particular way or look in the suspect’s mouth.

Jeremy Richey

In Illinois, when the police arrest a person for driving under the influence of alcohol, two things happen: (a) the government files a criminal case potentially punishable by jail time, and (b) the government suspends the person’s driver’s license. Regarding the license suspension, if a driver files a petition challenging the suspension (and gives the State notice that the petition has been filed), with one exception, the State must hold a hearing on the petition within 30 days.

The one exception is discussed in a new opinion by the Illinois Appellate Court. In People v. Janas (.pdf), the Court interpreted the first portion of 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b). This portion of the statute reads as follows:

Within 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension [being] served [. . .], the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded. Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket [. . .], the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction.

In Janas, the State did not hold a rescission hearing within the 30-day window. Instead, it intended to hold the hearing on the date of the driver’s first court appearance, which was four days beyond the 30-day window. The trial court rescinded (canceled) the driver’s suspension since there was not a hearing within the 30-day time period. The appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court because the State had two options based on the statute in question: (a) conduct a hearing on the driver’s petition within 30 days, or (b) have the hearing on the first court appearance date on the driver’s ticket. Since the State was ready to proceed on the date of the driver’s first court appearance, the trial court should have conducted a hearing on the petition.

Jeremy Richey

In a previous post, I discussed the purpose of the driver’s license suspension warnings that the police give motorists during the DUI arrest process. This post looks at the actual suspensions. What purpose do they serve? People v. Bailey* provides the answer: “The implied consent statute reflects the concern of the legislature over the threat to the public imposed by drivers impaired by alcohol or other drugs and serves to deter and remove problem drivers from the highways, thus making the highways safer.”

Jeremy Richey

*612 N.E.2d 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).

Shh, don’t tell Greenfield that I published a legal guide on Avvo about DUI in Illinois.

Jeremy Richey

In Illinois, if you are arrested for DUI and you are a first offender, your driver’s license will be suspended for six months if you fail chemical testing and for 12 months if you refuse chemical testing.* Before an officer asks you to submit to chemical testing, he will warn you of the consequences of refusing the testing and of failing the testing.  What is the purpose of the warnings? Is it to help you make an informed decision? Nope, the purpose is to coerce you into providing evidence for the government.  This is what People v. Ehley (.pdf) (internal citations omitted) has to say:

A person asked to submit to law-enforcement-directed testing [. . .] must be warned by the officer that (1) refusing to submit to a test will result in a statutory summary suspension and (2) submitting to a test that shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater will result in statutory summary suspension.  The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the warnings are not meant to enable an “informed choice” but are an evidence-gathering tool for the State.   That is, the suspension provisions are meant to motivate drivers to submit to testing.

Jeremy Richey

*If you thought that the suspension periods were 3 months for failure and 6 months for refusal, you’re wrong.  Those were the suspension periods in 2008.   Things have changed for 2009 and beyond.